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Federal Rules of Evidence: Raising the Bar on Admis-
sibility of Expert Testimony: Can Your Expert Make the
Grade After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael?
L Introduction
Expert testimony has long played an important role in both civil and criminal
trials. In many instances, an expert's testimony means the difference between
winning and losing the case. Lawyers continue to debate the proper criteria for
determining whether an expert's testimony should be admitted at trial. For most of
the twentieth century, admission of expert testimony in the federal court system was
based upon the "general acceptance" standard laid down by the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia in Frye v. United States.' But in the 1993 landmark
case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 the U.S. Supreme Court
established that expert testimony regarding scientific evidence must be both reliable
and relevant as a precondition to admissibility The Court went on to identify
several factors that may assist the trial judge in determining admissibility. The
Court's ruling in Daubert, however, left many questions unanswered, the most
significant being whether the criteria established by the Court for determining the
reliability of testimony by scientific experts also applies to the much broader realm
of nonscientific expert testimony. The Court's recent decision in Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael' answered this question in the affirmative.
This note examines the Kumho decision in light of precedent and also ponders the
ramifications of the decision for today's trial lawyers. Kumho's clarification of the
ruling in Daubert is likely to have a significant effect on the selection and
preparation of experts in both civil litigation and criminal trials. Part I briefly
discusses the development of the law pertaining to the admissibility of expert
testimony in federal courts, focusing on the disagreement among the United States
courts of appeal on the applicability of Daubert to nonscientific expert testimony.
The Tenth Circuit was among those courts that had applied Daubert only to
scientific testimony.- Part IT explores the Court's decision in Kumho. Part IV
examines the decision's likely impact in both the civil and criminal arenas and looks
at the judge's role as "gatekeeper." Finally, Part V addresses the recent amendment
to Federal Rule 702 concerning expert testimony and what it means in light of the
prior Supreme Court decisions.6 In addition, Part V compares the recent
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see discussion infra Part II.A.
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. See id. at 589-91.
4. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
5. See Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).
6. The Advisory Conmittee amended Rule 702 in response to Daubert and the cases that followed.
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amendment to the different approach proffered by the authors of a recent
amendment to Rule 702 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
IL A Brief History of the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Federal Courts
A. Frye v. United States
The Frye test, or "general acceptance" test, for expert testimony originated in the
appeal of a murder conviction in the District of Columbia! The 1923 decision
concerned the admissibility of expert testimony regarding a systolic blood pressure
deception test. The test, an early version of the modern polygraph examination,
measured changes in blood pressure and was based on a theory that lying requires
a conscious effort that produces a corresponding change in blood pressure. Before
trial, the defendant had taken the test and passed. His attorney sought to admit the
results through the testimony of the scientist who conducted the examination. The
trial court sustained an objection by the government. On appeal, the court held that
the test had not gained "general acceptance" among authorities in that particular
field sufficient to justify admission Specifically, the court found that the deception
test had "not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus
far made."9 Thereafter, for the next seventy years, the "general acceptance" test was
the standard by which most courts determined the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence at trial."0 With the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
however, many questioned Frye's continuing validity. In United States v.
Downing,"2 the Third Circuit found that the "general acceptance" test in Frye may
be inconsistent with the Federal Rules. The court reasoned that some scientific
testimony that has not yet become "generally accepted" may nevertheless comply
with Rule 7022 if it meets the basic relevancy requirement of Rule 401 " and
assists the trier of fact in determining facts at issue."4 The fate of the Frye test was
decided by the Supreme Court in Daubert.
7. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
11. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
12. Rule 702 was recently amended effective December 1. 2000. The rule formerly provided: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702 (prior to
recent amendment).
13. FED. R. EVID. 401.




B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In Daubert, two minor children and their parents sued Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals alleging that the prenatal drug ingested by the mother and manufactured
by Merrell Dow caused serious birth defects in the children. 5 Merrell Dow
submitted the testimony of a well-credentialed expert on the risks of chemical
exposure. The expert reviewed all the literature on the drug and numerous published
studies, finding that the drug was not a risk factor for human birth defects. The
plaintiffs responded by producing testimony from eight well-credentialed experts
who concluded after reviewing animal and pharmacological studies that the drug
could cause birth defects. 6 The district court granted summary judgment for
Merrell Dow after concluding that the evidence proffered by plaintiffs' experts did
not satisfy the "general acceptance" test because their opinions were not based on
epidemiological evidence. 7 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court granted
certiorari to determine the proper standard for admissibility of expert testimony.
The plaintiffs challenged the "general acceptance" test on grounds that Frye was
superseded by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975." Rule 702
provided guidance regarding expert testimony but did not mention "general
acceptance" as the criterion for admissibility. 9 For this reason, and because the
Justices felt that an exclusive "general acceptance" test was inconsistent with the
liberal approach of the Federal Rules concerning opinion testimony, the Court
determined that Frye did not merge into the Federal Rules.' Turning its attention
to Rule 702, the Court held that the rule requires that an expert's testimony
regarding scientific knowledge must be both reliable and relevant.2' The Court
further determined that under Rule 104(a), the trial judge must make a preliminary
assessment regarding reliability and relevancy.' This requirement represented a
major departure from Frye where the courts had deferred to the scientific
community to assess reliability. The emphasis for trial judges thus expanded from
determining relevancy - whether the expert's knowledge could assist the trier of
fact in determining a fact in issue - to also include a determination on reliability.
To assist trial judges with this "gatekeeping" responsibility, the Court made four
general observations that trial judges should consider: (1) whether the scientific
theory or technique has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether there are known or potential
rates of error with the technique; and (4) whether the theory or technique has
15. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
16. See id at 582-83.
17. The plaintiffs' experts had relied upon animal-cell and live-animal studies rather than human
statistical studies. See id. at 583-84.
18. See id. at 587.
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
21. See id. at 589-91.
22. See id. at 592-93.
2000
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achieved "general acceptance" within the scientific community.' Thus, the Frye
test lives on but only as one factor that a court should consider in determining
reliability.
Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that Frye was superseded by the Federal Rules but
he did not join that part of the Court's opinion that discussed the factors that courts
may use in determining admissibility?4 He opposed offering such general guidance
in the abstract when the factors are not being applied to particular expert tes-
timony.'s Moreover, the Chief Justice asked the question left unanswered until
Kumho - do the admissibility factors also apply to nonscientific expert testimony?
He expressed concern that imposing the responsibility on trial judges to make
preliminary assessments regarding reliability places them in the position of having
to become "amateur scientists."'0
C. Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc.
In Compton, the Tenth Circuit reached the issue of whether the Daubert factors
apply when expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training."
Compton involved a product liability action against an auto manufacturer and its
distributor for injuries sustained when the vehicle's roof collapsed in a rollover
accident. Four teenagers had been drinking heavily and were out joyriding when
one of the passengers grabbed the steering wheel causing the vehicle to skid across
the road into a ditch. The plaintiff, a backseat passenger, was paralyzed during the
rollover when the roof and one side of the vehicle caved in on him, injuring his
spinal cord.' The plaintiff alleged that the automobile's defective design caused
the roof and side of the vehicle to collapse excessively. The defendants objected to
the plaintiffs design expert on the ground that his background as an aerospace and
mechanical engineer did not qualify him to testify about roof designs." The court
allowed the testimony. The expert identified areas where the roof structure required
additional support. He also proposed new headroom requirements based upon his
experience in examining other accident vehicles and his review of various
publications in the automotive industry. In the end, the jury found the defendants
partially liable for the plaintiffs injuries."
The Tenth Circuit held that Daubert applies only when an expert relies upon a
certain principle or methodology. The court found that the plaintiffs expert
formulated his conclusions based upon "general engineering principles and his 22
years of experience as an automotive engineer."" Though the expert had never
participated in rollover tests to determine the roof strength of automobiles, the court
23. See id at 593-94.
24. See id at 598 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
25. See id
26. See id at 600-01.
27. See Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1996).
28. See id. at 1516.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1516-17.




concluded that his testimony was admissible because he was "within the reasonable
confines of his subject area."32 In addition to his aerospace and mechanical
engineering experience, the expert had worked at Ford Motor Company for many
years where he was involved in a roof design project, and later as a consulting
engineer, analyzing roof designs on various vehicles.33
The Tenth Circuit's holding that Daubert did not apply to nonscientific expert
testimony reflected the view of roughly half of the circuit courts.' The remaining
circuit courts applied Daubert to a variety of situations. 5 As a result of the split
among the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kumho to
determine the scope of Daubert6
III. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
A tire on a minivan driven by Patrick Carmichael blew out, resulting in an
accident that killed one family member and severely injured several others. The
Carmichaels brought a diversity suit against the tire manufacturer and distributor,
jointly referred to as Kumho Tire Company, alleging that the tire was defective.37
The Carmichaels' tire expert, Dennis Carlson, concluded that a defect in the tire
caused the tread to separate from the inner steel-belted carcass resulting in the blow
out. This conclusion was based upon three propositions: (1) a separation not caused
by "overdeflection"3 ordinarily results from a tire defect; (2) if the tire has
overdeflected sufficient to cause a separation, this should be indicated by four
specific characteristics;39 and (3) if two of the four characteristics are not present
32. Id. at 1520.
33. See id. at 1519-20.
34. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 (1lth Cir. 1997) (holding that
tire failure expert's testimony was based on experience, not science, so Daubert standards do not apply);
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that testimony of government expert
on modus operandi of cocaine traffickers is "specialized" knowledge and thus beyond the scope of
Daubert); Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1384 (4thCir. 1995) (finding testimony by liver
toxicity expert based on sound methodology); lacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19,
25 (2d Cir. 1994) (admitting nonscientific findings of geotechnical and underground construction
consultants).
35. See, e.g., Surace v. Caterpillar, Inc., 11 F.3d 1039, 1055-56 (3d Cir. 1997) (electromechanical
engineer); United States v. Kayne, 90 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1996) (coin dealers); United States v. 14.38
Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1996) (civil engineer and real estate appraiser); Den
Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank, 75 F.3d 49, 57 (1st Cir. 1996) (banking industry expert); United
States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 850-52 (3d Cir. 1995) (handwriting expert); Cook v. American
Steamship Co., 53 F.3d 733, 739 (6th Cir. 1995) (metal product tester); Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co.,
36 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 1994) (accident reconstruction expert); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,
999 F.2d 549, 569-70 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (income/investment analyst).
36. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146 (1999).
37. See id at 141.
38. "[O]verdeflection ... consists of underinflating the tire or causing it to carry too much weight,
thereby generating heat that can undo the chemical tread/carcass bond . I..." Id  at 144.
39. Carlson's four symptoms included: (1) tread wear on the shoulder of the tire that is greater than
in the center; (2) signs of "bead groove," an indicator that the steel wire loops holding the flexible cords
together at the bottom edges have been pushed too hard against part of the wheel assembly located inside
200
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in the tire, either a manufacturing or design defect caused the separation!" Carlson
conceded that the tire showed some of the characteristics, but he did not find
sufficient symptoms of overdeflection.4 ' Kumho claimed that Carlson's
methodology did not satisfy the requirement for reliability under Rule 702
established in Daubert.
The district court excluded Carlson's testimony after finding that it did not satisfy
any of the Daubert reliability factors.42 The Carmichaels moved for recon-
sideration, claiming that the court was too stringent in its application of Daubert.
The court agreed that the Daubert factors are not exclusive, thus allowing for
consideration of other factors, but it affirmed its earlier ruling based upon a concern
over Carlson's methodology. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that Daubert
was explicitly limited to scientific evidence.43
The Supreme Court determined that the language of Rule 702 does not
distinguish between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized"
knowledge." Daubert referred only to scientific knowledge because that was the
type of testimony at issue in that case. The Court expressed concern over any
interpretation of Rule 702 that would require a judge to determine whether
testimony was "scientific" or "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge because
there are no clear dividing lines among the three areas. Re-emphasizing that the
Daubert factors are not a "definitive checklist," the Court nevertheless found that
some of the factors might apply to testimony based on experience. Moreover, the
Court concluded that a trial court is given "the same broad latitude when it decides
how to determine reliability as it enjoys with respect to its ultimate reliability
determination."' The Court also determined that the "gatekeeping" requirement of
Daubert requires that an expert apply the same "intellectual rigor" in court that he
would apply if he were working in the relevant field.47
Applying Daubert, the Court found that Carlson's methodology was impliedly
based upon the premise that he could determine from a visual and tactile inspection
whether the tire had been abused. The Court questioned the reliability of any
inspection method that could determine tire abuse with some degree of certainty, but
could not determine with any certainty how many miles the tire had traveled. The
the tire's rim; (3) discoloration, an indication the sidewalls have deteriorated; and (4) marks on the tire's
rim flange. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 146.
43. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997).
44. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147.
45. Id. at 146-47. Technical knowledge covers the range between scientific and other specialized
knowledge and often is indistinguishable from them. For example, engineering is an area of technical
knowledge, but science plays a key role in the field. See EXPERT EVIDENCE: A PRACrITIONER'S GUIDE
TO LAW, SCIENCE AND ThE FJC MANUAL 51 (Bert Black & Patrick W. Lee eds., 1997).
46. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
47. 1l
48. Carlson could not determine whether the tire had traveled less than 10,000 miles or more than




Court agreed with the district court's determination that Carlson's testimony did not
satisfy any of the Daubert factors for reliability' No other experts in that field
used the "two-factor" test or relied as much as Carlson had on small differences in
tread depth between the shoulder and center of the tire. Nor had any expert on tire
testing validated Carlson's methodology.' Ultimately, the Court found no abuse
of discretion in the exclusion of Carlson's testimony. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia cautioned that though the Daubert factors are not a "holy writ," a trial
court's failure to apply the factors in certain cases might constitute an abuse of
discretion."'
IV. Analysis
A. The General Impact of Kumho
Though the decision in Kumho is merely a clarification of the Court's earlier
decision in Daubert, it may have far-reaching consequences for trial lawyers in civil
litigation and, to some extent, criminal cases. For one thing, before Kumho, the
differing views on Daubert among the circuits concerning the applicability of the
Daubert reliability factors to technical and specialized knowledge may have
encouraged forum shopping. Plaintiffs could seek out a jurisdiction that espoused
a narrow interpretation of "science," while defense counsel preferred those courts
that took a broader view of the subject in order to bring the expert within the scope
of Daubert.'
Moreover, the broad discretion judges now have in screening all types of experts
will likely cause increased uncertainty among lawyers regarding the admissibility
of expert testimony. This in turn may lead to more extensive pre-trial discovery and
a significant increase in Daubert challenges through motions in limine aimed at
excluding the opposition's expert.' Professor Edward Imwinkelried believes that
applying Daubert to nonscientific expert testimony will bring an increased reliance
on Daubert's "general acceptance" factor.' Ironically, he points out, reliance would
be the exact opposite of admissibility determinations made under Frye prior to
Daubert when most courts applied the "general acceptance" test to scientific
testimony but exempted nonscientific testimony.5 Additionally, with Daubert now
applicable to all types of expert testimony, the incentive no longer exists to call
49. See id. at 157.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. See Nicholas Targ & Elise Feldman, Courting Science: Expert Testimony After Daubert and
Carmichael, 13 NAT'L REsouRcEs & ENv~r 507, 510-11 (1999).
53. See Supreme Court Decisions Will Affect Discovety, Work Product, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE &
LUG. STRATEY, July 1999, at 4.
54. See Edward J. lmw.inkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly Epis-
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experts with technical or other specialized knowledge rather than those having
scientific knowledge in a tactical move to avoid Daubert's reach.
In a similar way, Kumho closes the loophole that allowed experts to describe their
testimony as based on experience and training rather than science in an effort to
avoid scrutiny under Daubert.' This loophole existed in Oklahoma under
Compton This is not to say that an expert can never be qualified based upon
experience alone. In Kumho, Justice Breyer stated that "trial court[s] should
consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable
measures of the reliability of expert testimony"" and that the judge's preliminary
inquiry must correspond to the facts of the case at bar. The clear message of Justice
Breyer is that the Daubert reliability factors are not the only relevant factors a court
should consider when evaluating an expert.
A comparison of Compton and the Ninth Circuit case of Thomas v. Newton
International Enterprises" illustrates this point. In Compton, the Tenth Circuit
admitted the expert's testimony because it was based on general engineering
principles and years of experience in automotive engineering.' The court applied
Daubert only when a witness's testimony was based upon a particular methodology
or technique." In this instance, the court found that because the expert's testimony
was not based on any particular methodology, Daubert was inapplicable.' In
Thomas, a longshore employee fell through the opening to a lower deck of a cargo
ship and sustained injuries. The employee brought a negligence action against the
vessel's owner for leaving the opening unguarded. The Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision to exclude the testimony of a longshore worker with twenty-
nine years experience in the industry who testified that leaving a deck opening
uncovered was extremely unusual and hazardous. The court found that his many
years of experience in various industry jobs laid the minimal foundation of
knowledge, skill, and experience necessary to testify as an expert on the working
conditions of longshore employees."
Is the absence of the Daubert test more significant in Compton than in Thomas?
The analysis performed by the roof design expert in Compton clearly involved a
methodology that should have been validated by other industry experts. Determining
how many pounds of force a vehicle's roof should be able to withstand requires the
application of engineering principles and other technical data and is likely subject
to known or potential rates of error. The plaintiffs expert had never conducted
56. See 'Kumlw Tire' Clarifies Use of 'Daubert': Supreme Court Says Case Is Not Limited to
Scientific Testimony, NAV'L LJ., Apr. 5, 1999, at BI.
57. Compton v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).
58. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (emphasis added).
59. 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994).
60. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1519.
61. See id
62. See id.
63. See Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1268.




rollover tests.' His theory had not been peer-reviewed or tested, nor was it
generally accepted in the industry.' Moreover, the district judge expressed doubts
about the expert's credibility, noting that scientific knowledge was involved, but he
nevertheless admitted the testimony, finding that it would help the jury determine
whether the roof design was defective.67 In contrast, the expert in Thomas testified
that in his experience, vessels normally have manhole covers or some type of
barricade over any opening and that not even an experienced employee would have
anticipated an uncovered area" In both cases, the court admitted the expert's
testimony on the basis of experience. Yet, the admission of the expert testimony in
Compton is more troublesome because more than general experience in automotive
engineering is necessary to analyze technical data regarding "roof crush."' Because
an expert's testimony does not have to satisfy the Daubert factors in every case, the
expert in Thomas may have survived scrutiny under Daubert on the basis of
experience alone." The longshore worker's testimony was relevant in that it
assisted the trier of fact in determining the fact of consequence in the action -
whether the owner of the vessel was negligent. Though the experienced-based
testimony did not lend itself to application of the four Daubert criteria, the court
could find it reliable due to the direct connection between the expert's years of
working around cargo vessels and his resulting knowledge of industry customs.
Ultimately, the trial judge must determine, based on the particular facts of the case,
when experience is sufficient to qualify a witness and when something more is
needed.
B. The Judge as "Gatekeeper"
Though much has been said about the four criteria set forth in Daubert, the
criteria were announced in dicta.7 The decision in Kumho emphasizes that the
heart of the "gatekeeping" requirement is the need to ensure the reliability and
relevancy of expert testimony?2 But how should judges perform this role? Michael
65. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1520.
66. See id. at 1517.
67. See id.
68. See Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1269.
69. See Compton, 82 F.3d at 1516.
70. Some commentators claim that the Daubert test does not work with nonscientific testimony
because the testimony cannot be validated in the same manner as scientific testimony. For example,
when a molecular biologist tests blood samples for a DNA match, a second molecular biologist can
obtain new samples from the same sources and use the same test to verify the results. In contrast, if an
attorney testifies in a legal malpractice action that the defendant attorney's conduct met the standard of
care of other attorneys in that area, a second attorney cannot repeat the first attorney's experiences, nor
can he test the first attorney's claim using special techniques. See Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 2284-
85. While these hypotheticals illustrate the difference between scientific and nonscientific testimony, this
author does not believe they show that Daubert does not work with nonscientific testimony. Instead, the
Daubert inquiry is a flexible one.
71. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 151 n.2 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
72. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
20001
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H. Gottesman, who represented the plaintiffs in both Daubert and General Electric
Co. v. Joiner" before the Supreme Court, places significant emphasis on the
"prestige factor." He believes that when a highly qualified scientist testifies within
a specialized field in which he works out of court, his opinions should be admitted
without further inquiry.' He finds it "preposterous" for judges to assert that they
know better than the experts that their methodology is unreliable 5 In Gottesman's
view, Daubert indicates that the Court has lost confidence in the ability of juries to
"separate the wheat from the chaff."'76 In the dissenting part of his Daubert
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed similar concerns. He opined that Rule
702 does not impose upon judges "either the obligation or the authority to become
amateur scientists in order to perform [the gatekeeping] ... role."
Does the "gatekeeper" role place too much responsibility on judges who are in
many cases unfamiliar with the specialized field of knowledge at issue? Justice
Breyer took up this point in his concurring opinion in Joiner. Breyer noted that
while judges must ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable, they
can overcome the difficulty in making admissibility determinations by: (1) using
pretrial conference authority to narrow the disputed scientific issues; (2) conducting
pretrial hearings where the court can examine potential experts; and (3) appointing
special masters and specially trained law clerks.!' Justice Breyer further noted that
Rule 706 allows judges to appoint independent experts and that established scientific
organizations could recommend reputable experts for this purpose.'
Federal District Judge Robert E. Jones took a unique approach to determining the
admissibility of expert testimony in a multidistrict product liability case involving
silicone breast implants. In Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,' Judge Jones
conducted a Rule 104 preliminary hearing on the admissibility of the scientific
evidence."1 Assisted by a physician, the court searched for technical advisors with
expertise in epidemiology, immunology, toxicology, rheumatology, and chemistry.
The physician screened dozens of individuals, selecting four "totally unbiased and
73. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). In Joiner, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the
appropriate standard of review for appellate courts reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude
scientific evidence under Daubert. The Court held that the proper standard of review is abuse of
discretion as in other evidentiary rulings. See id. at 146. In doing so, the Court rejected the plaintiffs
argument that because the granting of summary judgment in the case was "outcome determinative," the
exclusion of evidence should have received a more stringent review. Id. at 142-43, The Court found that
trial judges should receive appropriate deference under the abuse of discretion standard whether they
admitted or excluded the expert testimony. See id. at 143.
74. Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor,
43 EMORY L. 867, 878 (1994).
75. Id. at 882.
76. Id. at 880.
77. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 601 (1995) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
78. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring).
79. See id.
80. 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).




uncommitted experts" who were subsequently appointed by the court.' To avoid
subjecting the technical advisors to depositions and testifying at trial as additional
witnesses, the judge appointed them under Rule 104 rather than Rule 706.3 The
advisors reviewed the parties' materials in preparation for the hearing and the parties
stipulated to the experts' qualifications under Rule 702. No evidentiary objections
were permitted. During the four-day hearing, counsel, the court, and the advisors
questioned the parties' experts.' Following the testimony, the advisors submitted
a report in response to five questions submitted by the court and those of the
parties.' After the court received the reports, the parties had one more opportunity
to question the advisors. In the end, the court granted the defendant's motion in
limine to exclude the plaintiffs expert testimony regarding causation of systemic
disease by the breast implants.' The cost for these technical advisors was borne
by the parties - to the tune of $76,000. The judge's request for federal funding
was denied." While this serves as a good example of a judge who took great
lengths to ensure an unbiased examination of the expert testimony, it is noteworthy
that this was a multidistrict product liability case and the parties had the resources
to fund such an undertaking. This type of hearing is the exception and not the rule.
C. The Impact on Tort Claims
Kumho potentially could have a significant impact on tort claims. Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Joiner discusses the need for society to encourage the creation of
82. Id. at 1392-93.
83. See id. at 1393 n.8. Rule 706(a) provides in pertinent part:
The court.. . may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection .... A witness so
appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition
may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the court or any
party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party
calling the witness.
FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
84. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393.
85. The court submitted the following questions:
I. Is the expert's opinion supported by scientific reasoning and methodology that is
generally accepted in the expert's particular scientific community or otherwise qualified
as stated in Daubert II... ?
2. Is the expert's opinion based upon scientifically reliable data?
3. If epidemiological studies have not been done or are inconclusive, what other data,
such as animal studies, biophysical data, clinical experience in the field, medical records,
differential diagnosis, preliminary studies, general scientific knowledge, and medical
literature can justify, to a reasonable medical probability, a conclusion concerning the
cause of the syndrome or disease at issue?
4. Do the methodology and data support the expert's conclusions?
5. Does the scientific data relied upon by the expert apply to the syndrome or disease
in issue in these cases? For instance, are epidemiological studies directed at other typical
or classical diseases relevant to an atypical disease?
Id. at 1393-94 (footnotes omitted).
86. See id at 1394.
87. See id. at 1393. Significantly, the prevailing party could not recover the fees as "costs" because
the advisors were not appointed under Rule 706. See id at 1393 n.9.
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new products in such areas as the pharmaceutical industry. He wrote that judges
have a responsibility to ensure that the "powerful engine of tort liability" is directed
at harmful substances, and not at beneficial ones." With Daubert now applicable
to all expert testimony, the nonscientific expert testimony that has helped fuel this
"engine" will face the scrutiny of the Daubert test in all federal courts and most
state courts.
The most significant impact of Kumho will likely occur in product liability cases.
Unlike the experience-based testimony of the longshore worker in Thomas, expert
testimony in product liability cases will likely have to survive application of the four
Daubert factors. What does it take to survive Daubert? The plaintiff in Stanczyk
v. Black & Decker, Inc." found out the hard way in a decision that plaintiffs might
find increasingly common in the aftermath of Kumho.
Decided shortly after Daubert, the case involved a product liability action against
Black & Decker alleging that a design defect in a mitre saw guard resulted in the
plaintiffs sustaining injuries from the exposed blade.' The plaintiffs expert,
Donald Clark, claimed he could design a guard that would significantly reduce the
portion of the blade that was exposed. Clark possessed the credentials - he was
a mechanical engineer and an experienced designer of saws - but his entire
analysis consisted of thinking about the concept for about one hour." He
conducted no engineering analysis. Subsequently, Black & Decker's expert
demonstrated that Clark's design was not feasible because it limited key uses of the
saw, such as the type of cuts and the size of wood pieces that could be cut.'
Clark's concept had been neither peer-reviewed nor published. The court found that
Clark's theory was "tested" to some degree, but that Clark's theory failed the test
when Black & Deckers expert presented diagrams and charts exposing the flaws in
Clark's proposed design." The court ultimately determined that Clark did not
satisfy any of the Daubert criteria and excluded the testimony. The court may
have viewed Clark as a "hired gun" who developed his theory solely for purposes
of the litigation."
To survive the Daubert test, it is critical that an expert demonstrate the reliability
of his theory. Consequently, every lawyer should keep the Daubert factors in mind
when selecting an expert. Attorneys James A. Young and Richard S. Margulies
have several ideas for helping litigators "Daubert-proof' their experts." First, they
emphasize the importance of demonstrating that the methodology used by the expert
88. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
89. 836 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
90. See id. at 566.
91. See id. at 566-67.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 567.
94. See id. at 567-68.
95. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
96. James A. Young & Richard S. Margulies, How to Daubert-Proof Your Witnesses, PROD. LIAB.




is recognized and used by others in the laboratory or in field tests 7 Second, they
recommend identifying in the expert report any peer-reviewed publications that
support the expert's theory or techniques, even if it is a minority view." If the
client can afford it, they also suggest obtaining a Daubert "certificate," which is
essentially an affidavit from an independent, qualified expert in that field which
addresses how the expert satisfies the Daubert reliability factors.' The emphasis
is clearly on building a complete record, one strong enough to persuade the trial
judge and to withstand appellate review.
A word of caution is appropriate here. Peer review is often a strong indicator of
reliability, but professional experts are now creating their own peer-reviewed
publications to benefit from the emphasis many courts give to peer review and
publication." ° The lesson: peer review is only as good as the peers performing the
review.
The Stanczyk case raises another significant issue that looms large after Kumho.
The plaintiff in Stanczyk argued that the scrutiny of his expert placed him in the
position of having to pay the expert $20,000 to $40,000 to create a new design for
the saw - an expense he could not afford. The court acknowledged the plaintiffs
dilemma but stated, "Daubert... requires these expenditures. Proof of any kind is
often expensive to gather. Scientific reliability and validity in our times is seldom
cheap, but at least when once established it can be used again and again at little
marginal cost.''.
Have Daubert and its progeny raised the cost of reliable expert testimony beyond
the reach of most plaintiffs? Clearly, in many instances it will be difficult for
plaintiffs to survive summary judgment in product cases if their expert's testimony
is inadmissible. Recall, however, the remarks of Justice Breyer in his concurring
opinion in Joiner that society benefits to a large degree from the many products on
the market today that have been produced for our convenience and comfort."
2
While manufacturers must develop products that are as safe as possible, public
policy should also prevent the recovery of high-dollar damage awards from
sympathetic juries by requiring a showing that a plaintiffs expert relied upon
theories and techniques that are reliable and supported by others in that field.
Otherwise, the cost of developing and producing such beneficial products will lead
to skyrocketing prices for consumers. Following Daubert and Kumho, the days
when courts "let all the experts in and the jury can sort them out" are over.
D. The Impact on Criminal Cases
Most of the focus on Kumho's impact will be on civil cases; however, the ruling




100. See 2 STEPHEN A. SALTBURG ET AL, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1060 (6th ed.
1994).
101. Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 568 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
102. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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hope that Kumho will open the door for them to block the testimony of government
expert witnesses on nonscientific topics. One commentator believes Kumho may
give trial judges the opportunity to evaluate and possibly exclude experts in such
fields as ballistics, forensic pathology, as well as testimony from police officers who
profess expertise in areas of criminal methodology, e.g., the usual methods of drug
traffickers, the meaning of gang signals, etc. 3 The wider latitude given to
criminal defendants in presenting evidence at trial may indicate that judges will have
a tendency to construe Kumho more strictly against the prosecution." At the same
time, others claim that Kumho is unlikely to harm most defendants' cases because
so many of them are indigent and represented by legal aid attorneys who do not
have sufficient funds to hire experts."1
So far, Kumho has had a mixed impact on federal prosecutions. Since the March
1999 decision, federal appellate courts have upheld, for example, the admissibility
of an FBI expert's testimony on the methodology of child molesters" and a police
captain's testimony on drug trafficking modus operandi."w Additionally, at least
one district court has admitted a police officer as an expert on the use of field
sobriety tests."m In the first two instances, the court found that such testimony
would be helpful to the jury but did not explain how the testimony satisfies
Daubert."" The court allowed the officer to testify on field sobriety tests based on
his specialized experience in that area and because the tests he used were widely
regarded as reliable."0 On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit recently reversed a
conviction in a child sex abuse case, finding that the district court failed to make
the reliability determination required by Kumho as to the testimony of a pediatrician
and a psychologist, two key prosecution experts."' Similarly, two federal district
courts have excluded as unreliable the testimony of handwriting and text analysis
experts regarding the authorship of questioned writings."'
Handwriting analysis is an area of expert testimony that has been the subject of
much debate. The following two cases illustrate how courts have viewed the subject
differently. Interestingly, both involve the same defense expert and each appellate
court took a different view of the expert's exclusion from trial by the district judge.
In United States v. Velasquez," the prosecution used a well-qualified handwriting
103. See Kumho Could Affect Criminal Cases, NATL L.J., Apr. 12, 1999, at A5.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 584-85 (7th Cir. 1999).
107. See United States v. Molina, 172 F.3d 1048, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1999).
108. See Volk v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 2d 888, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
109. See Romero, 189 F.3d at 584-85; Molina, 172 F.3d at 1056.
110. See Volk, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
111. See United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2000).
112. See United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1192-93 (D. Neb. 2000) (finding that
handwriting analysis testimony on unique identification lacks the validity and reliability of other forensic
evidence such as fingerprint or DNA evidence); United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F. Supp. 2d 515, 523 (D.
N.J. 2000) (questioning the reliability of FBI forensic stylistic expert's testimony as to authorship of
threatening letters).




expert from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service to testify that the handwriting on a
mailing label used to ship drugs was that of the defendant's alleged accomplices.
The defense called Mark Denbeaux, a law professor and critic of handwriting
analysis, to refute the expert's methodology.' The district court excluded
Denbeaux's testimony noting a lack of formal training and practical experience in
the field of handwriting analysis."5 The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that
Denbeaux's testimony would have assisted the jury in weighing the testimony of the
government's expert."6 Applying Daubert to Denbeaux's testimony, the Third
Circuit distinguished the qualifications necessary to conduct handwriting analysis
from those sufficient to criticize the standards used by handwriting analysts. The
court found that Denbeaux had acquired enough specialized knowledge to criticize
the standards and error rate in the field and that his views had been tested,
published, and subjected to peer review. " '
Four years later in United States v. Paul,"' another criminal defendant sought
to admit Denbeaux's testimony to rebut the government's expert. The district court
excluded Denbeaux's testimony finding that it would confuse the jury."' This time
the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
Denbeaux did not have any "skill, experience, training, or education in the field of
handwriting analysis," and his experience as a lawyer was no substitute.'2" The
court further reasoned that Denbeaux's previous research of the literature on
handwriting analysis did not make him any more qualified than a lay person who
114. The government's expert described her method as that commonly used by other experts in the
field:
First, the expert determines whether a questioned document contains a sufficient amount
of writing and enough individual characteristics to permit identification. After determining
that the questioned document is identifiable, the expert examines the submitted
handwriting specimens in the same manner. If both the questioned document and the
specimens contain sufficient identifiable characteristics, then the expert compares those
characteristics, e.g., the slant of the writing, the shapes of the letters, the letter connec-
tions, the height of letters, the spacing between letters, the spacing between words, the 'i'
dots and 't' crosses, etc.. . . After making these comparisons, the expert weighs the
evidence, considering both the similarities and differences in the handwriting and
determines whether or not there is a match.
Id. at 846 n.3.
115. Denbeaux was not a member of any professional organization and had never given opinions
regarding the authorship of documents. See id. at 847. He researched handwriting analysis for eight
years, reading almost all the literature on the subject. He helped create a test for the certification of
handwriting analysts and validation of their work and co-authored a law review article that questioned
the validity of handwriting analysis based upon what he perceived were inadequate standards. See id.
at 847 n.4; see also D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise'" 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731 (1989).
116. See Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 848.
117. The only reference to publication was the law review article Denbeaux coauthored. See id. at
851.
118. 175 F.3d 906 (1 1th Cir. 1999).
119. See id. at 909.
120. Id. at 912.
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had read the same articles.' Also significant in the court's view was the fact that
Denbeaux had not done any research or writing on handwriting expertise in the ten
years since he coauthored a law review article on the subject."
The different outcomes of these two cases demonstrate key points that trial
lawyers should note. First, lawyers should ensure that the expert chosen is current
in his or her field. Resting on the expert's past accomplishments can be fatal to a
client's case. Second, different judges may take diametrical points of view about the
qualifications of a particular witness. The broad discretion granted to the trial judge
as "gatekeeper" under Daubert and Kumho means, in practical terms, that whether
an expert gets admitted at trial will in many cases depend on which judge is
assigned to the case. Finally, lawyers should follow a court's prior Daubert rulings
closely to determine, for example, whether a particular judge places an emphasis on
publication, peer-review, testing, or perhaps training and experience. In many cases,
the witness's field of expertise will help determine which factors are most important.
V. Key Changes to Federal and Uniform Rules of Evidence
Until recently, the language of Federal Rule 702 and Uniform Rule 702 was
identical." In 1999, significant changes were made to both. The Advisory Commit-
tee on the Federal Rules of Evidence referred the final draft of a proposed amendment
to Federal Rule 702 to the Judicial Conferences Standing Committee, which approved
it in September 1999. The amendment took effect on December 1, 2000. Similarly,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has approved a
major revision of its version of Rule 702.
First proposed in 1998, the revised Federal Rule 702 incorporates much of the case
law from Daubert through Kumho. The amended rule provides:'
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.'"
121. See id.; see also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
122. The court reasoned:
At the time of the trial, Denbeaux had done virtually no further research or writing on the
subject of the reliability of handwriting expertise since the University of Pennsylvania
published his law review article in 1989. During cross-examination, he admitted that he
was not a questioned documents examiner, had received no formal training in the field,
had never attended seminars on handwriting analysis, had never worked in a questioned
documents laboratory and was not a member of any professional organizations in the field.
Paul, 175 F.3d at 912.
123. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.




The rule codifies the "gatekeeping" role of judges set forth in Daubert and, consistent
with Kumho, the admissibility criteria applies to all types of expert testimony.'2
Recognizing that the Daubert reliability factors are not an exclusive list and in some
cases may not be applicable at all, the Advisory Committee Note identifies additional
factors used by the Supreme Court and circuit courts since Daubert.' The
Committee emphasizes that Daubert was not intended as a sweeping change in
evaluating the testimony of experts and that the amended rule should not be viewed
as an "automatic challenge to the testimony of every exper"t Parties must show
the judge only by a preponderance of evidence that their expert's opinion is
reliable." Significantly, the Committee adds, "The evidentiary requirement of
reliability is lower than the merits standard of conectness."' This statement may
prove helpful in admitting an expert who represents a minority view. The Advisory
Committee added three conditions for admissibility to the existing rule, using the
Committee Note to explain their meaning. Interestingly, the example used by the
Committee to illustrate the third condition for admissibility is testimony by law
enforcement agents regarding the use of code words by drug dealers during
transactions."3° The Committee states that if the agent's experience is reliable, the
testimony should be admitted. The inclusion of this example in the Committee Note
may have been in response to concerns expressed by some in the law enforcement
community after Kumho. Not surprisingly, then, the Committee also emphasizes that
in some instances experts may be qualified on experience alone. In such situations,
the expert must explain how his experience led him to his conclusion, why that
experience is sufficient to draw the conclusion, and how his experience reliably applies
to the case.' This recent amendment is unlikely to change the post-Kumho
evidentiary landscape because the new rule simply reflects the existing federal case
law on expert testimony.
In contrast, the Uniform Rules Drafting Committee has restructured its version of
Rule 702," adding well-defined presumptions and enumerating seven reliability
125. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
126. The additional factors include: (1) whether the proposed testimony is the result of research
conducted independent of the litigation; (2) whether the expert's conclusion is reasonable given the
accepted premise; (3) whether the expert has considered alternative causes; (4) whether the expert is
exercising the same care in testifying as an expert working in that field; and (5) whether the field of




130. See supra notes 103, 107 and accompanying text.
131. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
132. Uniform Rule 702 provides:
(a) General rule. If a witness's testimony is based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge, the witness may testify in the form of opinion or otherwise if the
court determines the following are satisfied:
(1) the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand evidence or determine a fact
in issue;
(2) the witness is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education as
an expert in the scientific, technical, or other specialized field;
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factors that, if relevant, courts must consider." The amendment provides for a
presumption of reliability regarding an expert's principle or method if the principle or
method has substantial acceptance within the relevant field. Conversely, a principle
or method that lacks substantial acceptance raises a presumption of unreliability."
Alan Tamarelli, a proponent of the presumption approach adopted by the Drafting
Committee, believes the use of rebuttable presumptions retains the strength of the Frye
"general acceptance" test while allowing experts to determine reliability without
automatically excluding theories because they have not been widely tested."
Allowing the experts to determine reliability avoids placing judges in the role of
"amateur scientist," a concern Tamarelli shares with Chief Justice Rehnquist."
Instead, the new rule places on the party challenging the reliability or unreliability of
(3) the testimony is based upon principles or methods that are reasonably reliable, as
established under subdivision (b), (c), (d), or (e);
(4) the testimony is based upon sufficient and reliable facts or data; and
(5) the witness has applied the principles or methods reliably to the facts of the case.
(b) Reliability deemed to exist. A principle or method is reasonably reliable if its
reliability has been established by controlling legislation or judicial decision.
(c) Presumption of reliability. A principle or method is presumed to be reasonably
reliable if it has substantial acceptance within the relevant scientific, technical, or
specialized community. A party may rebut the presumption by proving that it is more
probable than not that the principle or method is not reasonably reliable.
(d) Presumption of unreliability. A principle or method is presumed not to be
reasonably reliable if it does not have substantial acceptance within the relevant scientific,
technical, or specialized community. A party may rebut the presumption by proving that
it is more probable than not that the principle or method is reasonably reliable.
(e) Other reliability factors. In determining the reliability of a principle or method, the
court shall consider all relevant additional factors, which may include:
(1) the extent to which the principle or method has been tested;
(2) the adequacy of research methods employed in testing the principle or method;
(3) the extent to which the principle or method has been published and subjected to
peer review;
(4) the rate of error in the application of the principle or method;
(5) the experience of the witness in the application of the principle or method;
(6) the extent to which the principle or method has gained acceptance within the
relevant scientific, technical, or specialized community; and
(7) the extent to which the witness's specialized field of knowledge has gained
acceptance within the general scientific, technical or specialized community.
UNiF. R. EVID. 702 (copy on file with the Oklahoma Law Review), available in
<http.//wwwlaw.upenn.edu/bll/ule/ure/evidl200.htm>.
133. The four Daubert factors are included. See. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 593-94 (1993).
134. See supra note 132.
135. See UNIF. R. EvID. 702 reporter's notes (Proposed Official Draft 1999) (quoting Alan W.
Tamarelli, Jr., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability -
The Questionable Wisdom of Abandoning the Peer Review Standard for Admitting Expert Testimony, 47
VAND. L. REv. 1175, 1199-1201 (1994)) (copy on file with the Oklahoma Law Review), available in
<http.//www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ure/evidam99.htm>; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
136. See UNIF. R. EVID. 702 reporter's notes (Proposed Official Draft 1999) (copy on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review), available in <http://www.law.upenn.edu/blllulc/ure/evidam99.htm>; see also




the methodology both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion
that it is more probable than not that the methodology is reliable or unreliable. 7 If
a party challenges one of the presumptions, the court will examine the seven reliability
factors.'38 The factors include not only a consideration of whether the principle or
method has gained wide acceptance but also whether the witness's specialized field of
knowledge itself is widely accepted.
39
The procedural difference between the two rules is noteworthy. Under the Uniform
Rule approach, the primary indicator of reliability should be peer review and
acceptance, which is intended to relieve the trial judge of the responsibility to play
"amateur scientist."'" The burden then rests upon the party challenging the expert
to produce evidence and ultimately persuade the court of the methodology's un-
reliability. Clearly, the judge's "gatekeeper" role under Daubert is modified somewhat
under the amended Uniform Rule. However, under our adversarial system one can
argue that it is appropriate that the parties retain more of the responsibility for
admitting or excluding expert testimony. The deference given to peer review under
the Uniform Rule approach may tend to favor plaintiffs because of its emphasis on the
"general acceptance" test which was the standard for so many years. Conversely, the
amended Federal Rule 702 may favor defendants because of its emphasis on the more
rigorous Daubert factors. In any event, once an expert's testimony is challenged under
the Uniform Rule, the procedure under both rules for determining admissibility is quite
similar.
VI. Conclusion
After Kumho, the requirements for admitting expert testimony are more clearly
defined, but lawyers are still left wondering in many cases whether their experts'
credentials and methodologies will survive the scrutiny. In the civil arena, there is
likely to be an increase in Daubert motions filed by defense counsel, which in turn
puts added pressure on plaintiffs to find solid, qualified experts to support their claims.
Criminal defense lawyers are likely to make similar challenges regarding the
prosecution's experts. Moreover, the wide latitude granted trial judges under Joiner
renders it unlikely that admissibility determinations will be reversed on appeal, despite
the warning given by Justice Scalia in Kumho that "[t]hough. . . the Daubert factors
are not a holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of them
may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.''
137. See UNIF. R. EVID. 702 reporter's notes (Proposed Official Draft) (copy on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review), available in <http.//www.law.upenn.edu/bllulc/ure/evidam99.htm>.
138. See id; see aLo supra note 132.
139. See UNIF. R. EVID. 702 reporter's notes (Proposed Official Draft) (copy on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review), available in <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ure/evidam99.htm>. Note that,
consistent with Daubert, the factors identified in subdivision (e) are not exclusive. See id.; see also supra
note 132.
140. See UNIF. R. EVID. 702 reporters notes (Proposed Official Draft 1999) (copy on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review), available in <http.//www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ure/evidam99.htm>.
141. Kurnho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 159 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Notwithstanding the likely changes in strategy among lawyers, the trial judges' wide
discretion may nevertheless allow them to rule in a manner consistent with Kumho
while adhering to their pre-Kumho philosophy. For example, judges in those circuits
that previously did not apply the Daubert factors to nonscientific testimony are still
free to admit testimony based upon the expert's experience or training alone if they
find that the experience or training provides an adequate foundation of relevancy and
reliability. In short, the judge has the role of "gatekeeper" but he also has the freedom
to widen or narrow the "gate" based upon his particular judicial philosophy. The
question then becomes: when is the failure to apply one or more of the Daubert
factors "unreasonable?"" Until the answer to that question is more evident,
attorneys should place increased emphasis on the Daubert factors in order to ensure
an expert's testimony will be admissible. For trial lawyers, the post-Kumho message
is clear - choose every expert carefully. Can your expert make the grade?
Douglas B. Maddock, Jr.
142. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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